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Civil Procedure. Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions, 218
A.3d 543 (R.I. 2019). Where a plaintiff serving a life sentence files
suit over an attack that occurred while the Plaintiff was in pretrial
detention, and where that complaint was dismissed by the trial
court under the state’s civil death statute, the state’s “raise-orwaive” rule controls the issue. Here, the “raise-or-waive” rule
means that Plaintiff has waived the argument that the trial justice
erred in failing to address his contention that the state’s civil death
statute is unconstitutional.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On May 12, 2010, a jury convicted Dana Gallop (Plaintiff) of
first-degree murder, felony assault, using a firearm when
committing a crime of violence, carrying a pistol without license,
and possession of arms by a person convicted of a crime of violence
who is a fugitive from justice, and declared him a habitual
offender.1 The trial justice sentenced him to two mandatory
consecutive life sentences, in addition to a twenty-year sentence to
be served consecutively with the second life sentence, and two tenyear sentences to run concurrently with the first life sentence.2
Plaintiff appealed and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed.3
The present case came before the Rhode Island Supreme Court
on October 2, 2019, and sprung from an incident that allegedly took
place on April 26, 2010.4 The Plaintiff alleged that he was attacked
by a fellow inmate, Rosado, while detained by Adult Correctional
Institutions (ACI) and while awaiting trial on multiple counts
related to a fatal shooting in Providence.5 Plaintiff alleged that as
a result of the attack he suffered lacerations and permanent facial

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions, 218 A.3d 543, 545 (R.I. 2019).
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Gallop, 89 A.3d 795, 806 (R.I. 2014)).
Id.
Id.
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scarring.6 Plaintiff alleged that the attack was made possible
because Rosado reported his intent to attack Plaintiff to a
correctional officer; that the officer spread the word of the planned
attack among “various ‘John Doe’ defendants” beforehand; and
finally that the officer “abandoned his post for eighteen minutes . . .
to afford Rosado the opportunity to carry out the assault.”7
On November 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed a civil complaint naming
various defendants, including the State of Rhode Island and ACI,
and alleging negligence for failing to properly protect him, in
addition to several other tort claims.8 On April 11, 2013, Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint that added two named defendants.9
Significantly, Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not add any state
or federal constitutional claims.10
The day before the trial was to start, the trial justice sua
sponte11 raised the issue of Rhode Island’s civil death statute based
on
Plaintiff’s
consecutive
life-imprisonment
sentences.12
Defendants moved to dismiss the case under section 13-6-1 on the
theory that the Plaintiff was civilly dead.13 The Plaintiff objected
and motioned for leave to file a second amended complaint, this
time adding a claim alleging violations of various constitutional
provisions but containing essentially the same tort allegations as
before.14 The trial justice granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss based on section 13-6-1 and did not address the Plaintiff’s
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. “As part of that initial complaint, plaintiff also alleged several additional common law tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional
distress, conspiracy and joint enterprise resulting in assault and battery, implied breach of warranty, failure to maintain ‘protective responsibilities[,]’ and
a violation of plaintiff’s civil rights.” Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 546.
11. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sua sponte” as “[w]ithout prompting or
suggestion; on its own motion.” Sua sponte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th
Pocket ed. 2016).
12. Gallop, 218 A.3d at 546; see also 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1 (civil death
mandates that persons serving life sentences “shall be deemed to be dead in all
respects, as if his or her natural death had taken place at the time of the conviction” and prohibits them from asserting civil actions).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.15 The plaintiff
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.16
The court held that the Plaintiff’s civil rights were
“extinguished by operation of law once his criminal conviction was
affirmed” and, because there was no constitutional challenge to
section 13-6-1, Plaintiff’s argument was confined to the federal civil
rights actions.17 Because the trial justice had dismissed the case
without addressing the Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, the
court vacated the judgment and remanded it with directions to hear
and decide the Plaintiff’s motion.18
On remand, Plaintiff presented the arguments in reverse,
arguing first that section 13-6-1 is unconstitutional and thus that
his federal civil rights claims should go forward.19 Plaintiff then
argued in the alternative that even if the federal civil rights claims
were disallowed, the tort claims should proceed because section 136-1 is unconstitutional.20 Finally, Plaintiff motioned for leave to
file a second amended complaint, arguing that there would be no
extreme prejudice to defendants if the motion were allowed.21
Defendants responded by pointing out that Plaintiff’s federal and
constitutional claims were first raised in the proposed second
amended complaint and thus were not properly before the court
and, moreover, that Plaintiff had already had six years to raise
these constitutional claims and had failed to do so.22 The trial
justice ultimately denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend because the
delay caused by filing the second amended complaint would result
in extreme prejudice to the defendants.23 Plaintiff again appealed.

15 Id.
16. Id.; see also Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions, 182 A.3d 1137,
1141 (R.I. 2018) (holding that “the [civil death] statute unambiguously declares
that a person such as plaintiff, who is serving a life sentence, is deemed civilly
dead and thus does not possess most commonly recognized civil rights”).
17. Gallop, 213 A.3d at 546.
18. Id. at 547.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review, the court affords great deference to the trial
justice’s ruling on a motion to amend.24 In this case the court noted
that it will not disturb a trial justice’s decision to grant or deny a
motion to amend unless the hearing justice committed an abuse of
discretion.25 Under this standard of review, the court first
addressed whether the trial justice properly denied the Plaintiff’s
motion to amend. The court noted that after a pleading has been
amended once, “leave to amend a pleading lies within the sound
discretion of the trial justice” and need not be granted “when doing
so would unduly prejudice the non-moving party.”26 Factors
indicating undue prejudice if a party were allowed to amend include
“undue delay in seeking to amend the complaint without any
reasonable explanation . . . or when the amendment would require
a significant amount of new discovery.”27 Abuse of discretion
“occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is
ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper
and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious
mistake in weighing them.”28
The court reviewed the record and found that the trial justice
“properly weighed all factors without allocating weight to any
improper factor” and that there was “more-than-adequate grounds”
to support the decision.29 The court noted the trial justice’s
conclusion that “plaintiff’s undue delay . . . would create substantial
prejudice to defendants” because of the additional discovery
required as well as the complexity of the statutory claims.30 The
court found that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion31 and
agreed with the trial justice’s denial of the motion “based upon the
proximity to the trial, additional significant discovery, and other

24. Id. at 548 (quoting Catucci v. Pacheco, 866 A.2d 509, 513 (R.I. 2005)).
25. Id. (quoting Barrette v. Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231, 1236 (R.I. 2009)).
26. Id. (quoting Weybosset Hill Investments, L.L.C. v. Rossi, 857 A.2d 231,
236 (R.I. 2004)).
27. Id. (quoting Faerber v. Cavanaugh, 568 A.2d 326, 330 (R.I. 2009)).
28. Id. at 549 (quoting Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717, 722 (R.I. 2016)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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pleadings needed in lateness of filing the motion”32 noting that the
record established “ample grounds supporting the trial justice’s
decision.”33
Having found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
justice,34 the court moved on to the issue of the constitutionality of
section 13-6-1 and found that the issue was barred by the state’s
“raise-or-waive” rule.35 The “raise-or-waive” rule, whereby a party
“cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it
was not raised before the trial court,”36 is “staunchly adhered to” by
the court.37 As part of its analysis, the court considered an
exception that “arises when basic constitutional rights are
involved”38 and would apply if “the alleged error [was] more than
harmless” and “implicate[d] an issue of constitutional dimension
derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been
known to counsel at the time of trial.”39 The court concluded that
because this case did not involve a novel rule of law that could not
reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial, this case
did not fall under the exception, and therefore, Plaintiff’s
opportunity to discuss the constitutionality of section 13-6-1 had
passed.40
COMMENTARY

The facts of this case neatly illustrate a complication created
by the civil death statute in Rhode Island, namely: if an inmate
serving a life sentence is considered civilly dead, what redress does
that inmate have when he or she is injured while serving out the
life sentence under the state’s care?
32. Id.
33. Id. Noting that the trial justice observed that “the case would really
have to start [over] from square one,” the court agreed that plaintiff’s undue
delay in bringing his new claims would create substantial prejudice for defendants, and that no reasonable explanation for the delay was ever provided by
plaintiff.” Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 550.
36. Id. (quoting Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019)).
37. Id. (quoting Cusick, 210 A.3d at 1204).
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 2010)).
40. Id.
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On the one hand, such an inmate is clearly alive. The
aggregate amount of money it costs the state to take care of the
inmate—to clothe, house, feed, and care for the inmate when ill—
attest to the fact that the inmate is alive. So long as he remains in
the facility, the inmate is also dependent upon the state—he is
unable to clothe, house, or feed himself. Moreover, the inmate is
not stationary or in a fixed position: an inmate quite likely moves
around the facility and encounters other inmates and staff during
his day-to-day affairs. On the other hand, the civil death statute
means that the inmate is dead “as if his or her natural death had
Under such
taken place at the time of the conviction.”41
circumstances it seems inevitable that at some point an accident or
fight may occur or perhaps negligence on the part of a prison guard,
janitor, or some employee on the food service staff.
This situation is untenable: the civil death statute leaves the
inmate in an impossible position, both “dead” but also very much
alive and still capable of being physically injured. Because the
statute “imposes a complete bar on life-prisoners’ right to access
courts” it is potentially violative of the Access to Courts Clause of
the Rhode Island Constitution.42 The statute places the court in
the awkward position of having to consider how a dead person can
suffer injury at the hands of the state in whose charge he has been
entrusted. In this case, the court seemed caught between a rock
and a hard place as it explains how a plaintiff who is “civilly dead”
is also owed “at the very least” a reasoned decision on the motion
for leave to file an amended complaint.43
The court pointed out that that the civil death statute has been
“on the books” since it was enacted in 190944 and “reiterated” the
principle that “repeal is the province of the Legislature.”45 In the
end, however, the court held that the plaintiff could only argue his
constitutional claims if they had been allowed in on a second
amended complaint, but they were not. The court’s conclusion that
the “raise-or-waive” rule controls here seems correct and, further,
41. See 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-6-1.
42. See James Michael Kovach, Comment, Life and Civil Death in the
Ocean State: Resurrecting Life-Prisoners’ Right to Access Courts in Rhode Island, 24 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 400, 411 (2019).
43. Gallop, 213 A.3d at 549.
44. Id. at 550.
45. Id. at 546.
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is in keeping with the nature of the rule, which is a “fundamental”
rule in Rhode Island that is “staunchly adhered to” by the court.46
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff
who is serving a life sentence brings suit because he was attacked
by another inmate during pretrial detention, and the lower court
already dismissed the claim under the state’s civil death statute,
the plaintiff has waived the argument that the state’s civil death
statute is unconstitutional under the “raise-or-waive” rule.
Thomas M. Wall

46. See id. at 550 (quoting Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I.
2019)).

